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STATE SUPREME COURTS AND THE




In 1966 the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice War-
ren issued the Miranda v. Arzona' ruling. In 1971 the "new" Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Burger issued the first in a series of rulings
which chipped away at Miranda .2 Since then many commentators have
speculated about the future of Miranda and have concluded that the fu-
ture looks dim.3 Even the more cautious legal journals have reached
similar conclusions. 4 Some have predicted that the Burger Court will
continue to undermine the substance of the decision, though perhaps
not actually overrule it,5 while another has predicted that the Court
"will assuredly overrule it within the near future."'6
The purpose of this article is not to analyze the rulings and add
another prediction to the list but to examine systematically the reaction
of state supreme courts to the rulings in order to determine whether
these courts have eroded the Miranda principles by failing to require
strict adherence to them. It is assumed that the state supreme court
judges, like the commentators, saw the apparent handwriting on the
* Associate professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Ph.D. Univer-
sity of California at Santa Barbara, 1976.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Commentators consider the Burger Court to
have begun with Burger's appointment, though by the time of this decision President Nixon
had made Justice Blackmun's appointment also.
3 Trimming Miranda, TIME, June 24, 1974, at 64; Berlow, Undercutting Miranda: The Burger
Court Way With Suspects, 224 NATION 498 (1976).
4 Ghetti, CriminalProcedure-Admissibility of Confessions-Dancing on the Grave ofMiranda?, 10
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1141 (1976); Pelander, Michigan a Tucker. A Warning About Miranda, 17
ARIz. L. REV. 188 (1975); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 THE SUP. CT.
REv. 99; Note, US v. Crocker-Setting the Stage for Miranda's Last Act?, 47 U. COLO. L. REV.
279 (1976). For a less pessimistic analysis, see Israel, Crzmial Procedure, the Burger Court, and the
Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320 (1977).
5 Pelander, supra note 4; Stone, supra note 4.
6 Ghetti, supra note 4, at 1178.
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wall and anticipated a continuous chipping away at the Miranda princi-
ples7 by the Burger Court. It is hypothesized that these judges took the
opportunity to erode the Miranda principles and, in fact, eroded them
even more than the Burger Court had already done.
Social scientists have used three models to characterize the relation-
ship between the Supreme Court and the lower federal and state courts.
The "hierarchical model" analogizes the judicial system to a pyramid,
with the Supreme Court at the pinnacle. According to this model, the
Court establishes important policy, and the lower courts implement the
policy automatically.8 The "bureaucratic model" also analogizes the ju-
dicial system to a pyramid, with the Supreme Court at the pinnacle.
But, according to this model, while the Court establishes important pol-
icy, the lower courts do not implement the policy automatically.
Rather, they impose bureaucratic constraints, such as inefficiency and
recalcitrance, upon the Court.9 The "interaction model" does not anal-
ogize the judicial system to a pyramid at all. Instead, according to this
model, the Court establishes some important policy. However, since the
Court hears relatively few cases, it must allow the lower courts to formu-
late key policy as well. Furthermore, the Court, by necessity, allows the
lower courts to evade some of its rulings.' 0
Social scientists have assessed the usefulness of these three models
by engaging in a variety of research. The most popular research has
been on the impact ofjudicial decisions." Initially this research focused
on the impact of the Supreme Court's race relations decisions.
Prompted by the resistance to the Court's Brown v. Board of Education 12
7 A survey of prosecutors found that they saw the apparent handwriting on the wall.
Gruhl & Spohn, The Supreme Courts Post-Miranda Rulings: Impact on Local Prosecutors, 3 LAw &
POLICY Q. 29 (1981). So, presumably, judges did too.
8 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 222 (1963).
9 W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); J. PELTASON, FEDERAL
COURTS IN THE PoLITICAL PROCESS (1955); M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND AD-
MINI sTRATIVE AGENCIES (1968); Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM.
POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 1017 (1959); Murphy, ChiefJustice Tafl and the Lower Court Bureau-
crazy: A Study inJudicial Administration, 24 J. OF POL. 453 (1962); Shapiro, Appeal, 14 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 629 (1980).
10 K. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN POLITICS: STATE COURT POLICY IMPACT
AND FUNCTIONS IN A LOCAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1967); K. VINES AND R. RICHARDSON,
THE POLrICS oF FEDERAL COURTS: LOWER COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1970);
Dolbeare, The Federal District Courts and Urban Public Poli.: An Exploratogy Study, in FRONTIERS
OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 373 (J. Grossman &J. Tanenhaus eds. 1969); Howard, Litigation Flow
in Three United States Courts ofAppeaLs, 8 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 33 (1973); Vines, The Role of Circuit
Courts of Appeals in the FederalJudicial Process: A Case Study, 7 MIDWEST J. OF POLITICAL SCI-
ENCE 305 (1963).
11 THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (T. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 2d ed.
1973); S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPEC-
TIVES (1970).
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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decision, social scientists tried to determine the extent to which resist-
ance to the decision resulted in noncompliance with it.13 Later, re-
searchers focused on the impact of the Court's decisions in other areas.
Foremost among these other areas is that of criminal rights. Social
scientists tried to determine the extent to which the Court's Mapp v.
Ohio ,14 Escobedo v. Illinois,15 Miranda, and In re Gaultl6 decisions resulted
in noncompliance by the lower state courts. 17 They found that many of
the courts were reluctant to relinquish their traditional, conservative
policies concerning the exclusionary rule, confessions, and juvenile
rights, even in the face of the Supreme Court's demands that the courts
adopt its more liberal policies. Consequently, researchers concluded
that these decisions resulted in substantial noncompliance.
Nevertheless, Miranda eventually resulted in general compliance. 18
Romans19 compared compliance with Escobedo and Miranda by state
supreme courts. He found little compliance with Escobedo but considera-
ble compliance with Miranda. He explained this difference by observing
that Escobedo, though unquestionably liberal in direction, was not partic-
ularly clear in specifics, thereby providing lower courts with an opportu-
nity to evade it.20 In contrast, Miranda was clear, and did not provide
lower courts with an opportunity to evade the decision.21 In addition,
this difference in compliance could have been explained by noting that
Miranda was the second major case in this line of decisions involving
13 J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION (1961); Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South, 26J.
OF POL. 337 (1964).
14 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
16 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17 For Mapp-Manwaring, The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio, in THE SUPREME COURT AS POL-
IcY-MAKER: THREE STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 1 (D. Everson ed.
1968); Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a US Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 109 (1973); Canon, Testing the Eectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the
State and Federal Levels: The Case of the Exclusionarv Rule, 5 Am. POL. Q. 57 (1977); M. Ban,
Local Courts Versus the Supreme Court: the Impact of Mapp v. Ohio (unpublished conven-
tion paper, American Political Science Association 1973). For Escobedo and Miranda-Kramer
& Riga, The New York Court ofAppeals and the United States Supreme Court, 1960-76, 8 PUBLIUs 75
(1978); Romans, The Role of State Supreme Courts in Judicial Poliv Making: Escobedo, Miranda and
the Use ofJudicialImpact Analysis, 27 W. POLITICAL Q. 38 (1974). For Gault-Lefstein, Staple-
ton, & Teitelbaum, In Search ofJuvenilejustice: Gault and its Implementation, 3 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 491 (1969).
18 Here "noncompliance" is used generally to mean a failure to follow the Supreme
Court's doctrine in similar, related cases. In the studies cited the term was operationalized
specifically to categorize reactions to whatever doctrine was involved.
19 Romans, supra, note 17.
20 Id at 42-51.
21 Id at 51-52, 58. In fact, one researcher interested in the comparative impact of clear
and ambiguous decisions called Miranda "exceedingly clear." L. BERKSON, THE SUPREME
COURT AND ITS PUBLICS: THE COMMUNICATION OF POLICY DECISIONS 47 (1978).
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confessions. As such, it signaled the Court's intention to make policy in
this area and, correspondingly, it warned the lower courts not to try to
evade it.22
From this research on the impact of judicial decisions upon the
lower courts, some conclusions and implications emerge. Lower courts
often do not faithfully comply with the Supreme Court's doctrine. This
has been especially true for its doctrine concerning criminal rights. The
Court must establish clear doctrine and indicate its determination to get
the lower courts to comply by issuing a series of decisions reinforcing its
doctrine. Once the Court no longer indicates its determination to en-
force a doctrine, the lower courts will sense less. pressure from the Court
to comply with it. Further, if the Court not only stops indicating its
determination to enforce a doctrine, but actually exhibits an intention
to erode it, the lower courts might erode the doctrine faster than the
Court does by itself. Hence two hypotheses emerge: the lower courts
eroded the Miranda doctrine and, in fact, eroded it further than the Bur-
ger Court itself already had done.
This article will evaluate these hypotheses by first discussing Mi-
randa and the Burger Court's post-iranda rulings and then comparing
these rulings with state supreme court holdings in related cases.
II. MZRdND4 AND THE BURGER COURT'S POST-MR4NDA RULINGS
Prior to 1964 courts generally used the "voluntariness" test to deter-
mine whether confessions could be admitted as evidence at trial. This
test asked, simply, whether the confessions were voluntary, given the to-
tality of the circumstances involved. Obviously, this test was highly sub-
jective.23 In 1964, the Court moved away from the voluntariness test by
proposing objective criteria to determine whether confessions could be
admitted. In Escobedo v. Illinois, it held that police must inform suspects,
before interrogation, that they have the right to remain silent. Also, it
held that police must allow suspects to consult with their attorney.
Otherwise, the confessions would be presumed to have been coerced.24
In 1966, the Miranda Court reaffirmed Escobedo and elaborated upon it.
The Court held that police must inform suspects that they have the
right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them,
22 Other research found the importance of a line of decisions to achieve compliance.
Gruhl, The Supreme Court's Impact on the Law of LibeL" Compliance by Lower Federal Courts, 33 W.
PoLrncAL Q. 502 (1980).
23 However, the court did assume that delay between arrest and arraignment constituted
coercion, and the Court held resulting confessions involuntary per se. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
24 Foreshadowing Escobedo, the Court ruled that statements obtained from an indicted
defendant who had counsel, but who did not have counsel with him when he made the state-
ments, were inadmissible. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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that they have the right to an attorney, and that if they cannot afford an
attorney the court will appoint one for them. The Court stipulated that
suspects may waive these rights if they do so knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily, but that they may also reassert these rights at any later
time.
In 1971, the Burger Court began to weaken Miranda. In Harrs .
New York, Chief Justice Burger announced that prosecutors could use
statements obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach defendants'
credibility if the defendants testified inconsistently with the earlier state-
ments. Miranda explicitly prohibited such use,25 but Burger declared the
prohibition mere dictum.26 He said Miranda should not be used as a
shield to commit perjury. Thus, the Court's attack on Miranda was evi-
dent.2 7 As Stone comments, "Hamris was an exercise of raw judicial
power .... -28 In 1974, the Court continued to weaken Miranda. In
Michigan v. Tucker,29 it decided that a prosecutor could use the fruits of
an interrogation which occurred before Miranda, and was not in accord-
ance with it, even though the trial actually took place after Miranda. A
Warren Court precedent had applied the Miranda requirements to all
trials, rather than interrogations, which occurred after Miranda.3° But
Justice Rehnquist said the police acted in good faith, by following the
Escobedo requirements in effect at the time of the interrogation, and ac-
tually followed all but one of the Miranda requirements. The police had
failed to advise the suspect that if he could not afford an attorney the
court would appoint one for him. The Warren Court stressed that this is
a critical component of the warnings. 3 1 But Rehnquist concluded that
25 "[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to
impeach his testimony at trial.. . . These statements are incriminating in any meaningful
sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver re-
quired for any other statement." 384 U.S. at 477.
26 "Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use
of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all neces-
sary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling." Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. at 224.
27 One commentator notes, "[r]ightly or wrongly, Miranda was deliberately structured to
canvass a wide range of problems, many of which were not directly raised by the cases before
the Court. This approach was thought necessary in order to 'give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.' 384 U.S. at 441-42. Thus, a
technical reading of Miranda, such as that employed in Harrir, would enable the Court to
label many critical aspects of the decision mere dictum and therefore not 'controlling.'"
Stone, supra note 4, at 107-08. Nevertheless, the Court has not used this means of undercut-
ting Miranda since Hanris. For other criticism, see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Niron Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198
(1971).
28 Stone, supra note 4, at 114.
29 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
30 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
31 "[I]t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney,
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the defendant received a fair trial, if not a perfect one.3 2
In 1975, the Court further weakened Miranda in a pair of cases. In
Oregon v. Haas3 3 it reaffirmed Harris. And in Michigan v. Mosleq,3 4 the
Court decided that a prosecutor could use statements obtained when
police resumed interrogation of a suspect two hours after the suspect cut
off the interrogation by asking for an attorney. The Warren Court had
said that police must stop immediately if suspects ask for an attorney,35
but did not say whether the police could resume the interrogation at a
later time. If Miranda is read literally, the police could not resume the.
interrogation. In Mosley, however, Justice Stewart rejected this reading,
arguing that it would "lead to absurd and unintended results."'3 6 He
noted that the suspect was given another set of warnings, interrogated
by another officer, and interrogated about another crime.37 The Court
concluded that the police were not trying to wear down the suspect's
resistance. 38 Justice Brennan, with Justice Marshall, dissenting, main-
tained that the majority's decision was not merely a refinement of Mi-
randa but another attack upon it.39 Brennan stated that, "[t]oday's
distortion of Miranda's constitutional principles can be viewed only as
yet another step in the erosion and, I suppose, ultimate overruling of
Miranda's enforcement of the privilege against self-incrimination." 40
Justice White reinforced this prediction. He said he expected the Court
to return to the voluntariness test.41
but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this
additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be un-
derstood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to
obtain one." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473.
32 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446.
33 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
34 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
35 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
36 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102.
37 But both interrogations concerned the same robberies. The second interrogation addi-
tionally concerned a shooting which occurred during one of the robberies.
38 423 U.S. at 106.
39 Brennan said that "renewed questioning itself is part of the process which invariably
operates to overcome the will of a suspect." Id at 114 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 Id at 112 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Id at 108 (White, J., concurring). Besides these rulings, the Court issued two rulings
concerning the definition of "custodial interrogation." In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977), the Court held that a parolee who was not forced to come to the police station and
who was not arrested when he did come was not in custody and, consequently, was not enti-
tled to Miranda warnings. More recently, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the
Court held that a suspect who directed police to a weapon in response to one officer's com-
ments to another was not interrogated and, consequently, was not denied the Miranda right to
maintain silence. These rulings did not necessarily weaken Miranda, since the Warren Court
never clearly defined "custodial interrogation." Regardless, analysis of cases concerning this




In addition to these rulings, the Burger Court refused to extend
Miranda to new situations. In 1976 and 1977, the Court refused to ex-
tend the protections to prison disciplinary hearings, 42 civil tax proceed-
ings,43 and grand jury investigations.44 The Warren Court might not
have extended Miranda to these situations either, but the Burger Court's
unwillingness to extend the suspects' rights did nothing to dispel the
feeling that the Court was gradually dismantling Miranda.45
On the other hand, the Burger Court passed up other opportunities
to erode Miranda further. In the aftermath of Hamis, some prosecutors
questioned defendants about their failure to give police an alibi during
interrogation. By pointing to the defendants' silence, prosecutors sought
to impeach their credibility. This tactic was a logical outgrowth of Har-
ris, but the Burger Court disallowed it. In 1975, in United States .
Hale,46 it ruled that federal prosecutors could not utilize the tactic. The
Court said defendants' silence could be interpreted in a variety of ways
and consequently had little probative value. And in 1976 in Doyle v.
Ohio ,47 the Court ruled that state prosecutors could not utilize the tactic
either. The Court said defendants' silence was protected by the Fifth
Amendment. 48
In conclusion, the Burger Court's rulings primarily served to
weaken Miranda, though at the same time they exhibited a reluctance to
weaken Miranda as much as they might have. As Israel observed, "the
fact remains that Miranda still is the law of the land. Moreover, while its
ramifications arguably have been narrowed, the Court has not cast
doubt upon its basic premise that the defendant's right against self-in-
crimination applies to police custodial interrogation . . . -49 In short,
the Court has become less strict in requiring adherence to its doctrine,
but has altered its doctrine in only one respect-allowing prosecutors to
42 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
43 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
44 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174
(1977).
45 To underscore this, Stone notes that in the four years before 1978 the Court granted
certiorari in only one of the 35 cases on its appellate docket in which defendants sought
review due to alleged violations of Miranda, while the Court granted certiorari in 13 of the 25
cases in which governments sought review. Stone, supra note 4, at 100.
46 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
47 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
48 Id at 617-19.
49 Israel, supra note 4, at 1374. In this context another ruling deserves mention. In Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court held that statements obtained after a former
mental patient had been arrested and given Miranda warnings were inadmissible, because the
former patient had been interrogated subtly without his counsel being present. The Court
rejected a request from 22 state attorneys general that it overrule Miranda; instead, it decided
the case on the basis of the sixth amendment.
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use illegally obtained statements to impeach defendants' credibility.5°
III. STATE SUPREME COURTS' RULINGS
State supreme courts readily invalidated blatant violations of Mi-
randa.51 However, the Burger Court's post-Miranda rulings concerned
less blatant violations of Miranda. From these rulings four issues contin-
ually arose before the state supreme courts: Could prosecutors use ille-
gally obtained statements to impeach defendants' credibility? Could
prosecutors use the fact that defendants were silent during interrogation
to impeach their credibility? Could prosecutors use statements made
when police gave suspects incorrect warnings? Could prosecutors use
statements made when police refused to stop interrogation after suspects
asked them to, or statements made when police agreed to stop but later
resumed interrogation?
All relevant state supreme court cases decided after Haris were in-
cluded in the study.52 Cases were deemed not relevant if they revolved
around the factual determination of whether suspects voluntarily
waived their rights. Of course, purported "factual determinations" can
camouflage a tendency to evade the Miranda guidelines.53 Even genuine
factual determinations which conclude that suspects' rights were vio-
lated also can conclude that the violations were "harmless errors" and
not reversible. 54 But without the record, it is impossible to assess the
courts' decisions, so these cases cannot be included.
50 Nevertheless, the Court probably has confused some lower court judges about the con-
tinuing validity of its doctrine. Consequently, it seems inappropriate to use "compliance-
noncompliance" terminology in evaluating lower court decisions. Such terminology
presumes that compliance can be ascertained clearly.
51 See, e.g., Nacoff v. State, 267 N.E.2d 165 (Ind. 1971); State v. Brecht, 485 P.2d 47
(Mont. 1971); State v. Cullison, 227 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1975); State v. Callihan, 320 So. 2d
155 (La. 1975).
52 State supreme court cases concerning these issues were culled from Shepard's U.S. Cita-
tions, beginning with cases decided the day after Harris and continuing through cases re-
ported in the 1976-1979 edition of the citations, published in January 1978. The term "state
supreme court" refers to the highest court in each state. The highest court in Kentucky,
Maryland, and New York is the court of appeals. The highest court, for criminal cases, in
Oklahoma and Texas is the court of criminal appeals.
53 For a discussion of voluntary waiver of rights, see Child, The Involuntag Confesion andthe
Right to Due Process.: Is a Crminal Defendant Better Protected in the Federal Courts than in Ohio?, 10
AKRON L. REv. 261 (1976). For an early analysis of cases in which "factual determinations"
may have camouflaged a tendency to evade the guidelines, see Comment, Waiver of Rights in
Police Interrogations: Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1969).
54 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). For analysis, see Field, Assessing the Harm-
lessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15
(1976).
1981]
JOHN GR UHL [Vol. 72
USING ILLEGALLY OBTAINED STATEMENTS TO IMPEACH CREDIBILITY
In Miranda, the Warren Court asserted that prosecutors should not
use illegally obtained statements for any purpose.55 But in Harris the
Burger Court ruled that prosecutors could use illegally obtained state-
ments to impeach defendants' credibility.56 Justice Brennan, dissenting,
noted that before the ruling fourteen state appellate courts and six fed-
eral appellate courts agreed that prosecutors could not use such state-
ments to impeach defendants' credibility, while only three state
appellate courts disagreed. 57 Since Harri, however, this tendency has
been reversed.
Of the twenty-seven state supreme courts which addressed the issue,
twenty-one fully embraced Hams.58 Typical of these was the Arkansas
court, which quoted Chief Justice Burger's opinion approvingly: "'The
shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of a defense. . . .' "59 Less typical were the Colorado
and Florida courts, which overruled their own precedents in order to
conform to Harris. Both criticized the ruling. One observed that it con-
tradicted the "plain English" of Miranda.60 The other observed that it
allowed jurors to use statements to assess credibility which were forbid-
den to be used in determining guilt. The court questioned whether ju-
rors could be this discriminating and disciplined.6'
55 384 U.S. at 477.
56 401 U.S. at 225-26.
57 Id at 231 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58 Campbell v. State, 341 So. 2d 742 (Ala. 1976); State v. Jorgenson, 108 Ariz. 476, 502
P.2d 158 (1972); State v. Johnson, 109 Ariz. 70, 505 P.2d 241 (1973); State v. Mincey, 115
Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977); Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971); Jorgen-
son v. People, 174 Colo. 144, 482 P.2d 962 (1971); People v. Harris, 191 Colo. 234, 552 P.2d
11 (1976); Hill v. State, 316 A.2d 557 (Del. 1974); State v. Retherford, 270 So. 2d 363 (Fla.
1973); Nowlin v. State, 346 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1977); McHan v. State, 232 Ga. 470, 207 S.E.2d
457 (1974); People v. Byers, 50 Il1. 2d 210, 278 N.E.2d 65 (1972); People v. Moore, 54 Ill. 2d
33, 294 N.E.2d 297 (1973); Davis v. State, 256 Ind. 58, 271 N.E.2d 893 (1971); Johnson v.
State, 258 Ind. 683, 284 N.E.2d 517 (1972); State v. Greene, 214 Kan. 78, 519 P.2d 651
(1974); State v. Andrews, 218 Kan. 156, 542 P.2d 325 (1975); State v. Manin, 352 A.2d 746
(Me. 1976); Commonwealth v. Harris, 364 Mass. 236, 303 N.E.2d 115 (1973); People v.
Brown, 399 Mich. 350, 249 N.W.2d 693 (1976); Booker v. State, 326 So. 2d 791 (Miss. 1976);
Murphy v. State, 336 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1976); State v. Bazis, 190 Neb. 586, 210 N.W.2d 919
(1973); Johnson v. State, 92 Nev. 405, 551 P.2d 241 (1976); State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 187
S.E.2d 111 (1972); State v. Overman, 284 N.C. 335, 200 S.E.2d 604 (1973); State v. Kassow,
28 Ohio St. 2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 435 (1971); Langdell v. State, 556 P.2d 1076 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1976); Riddell v. Rhay, 79 Wash. 2d 248, 484 P.2d 907 (1971); State v. Davis, 82 Wash.
2d 790, 514 P.2d 149 (1973); Ameen v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 175, 186 N.W.2d 206 (1971); Wold v.
State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973).
59 Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. at 564, 466 S.W.2d at 480 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. at 226).
60 Jorgenson v. People, 174 Colo. at 148, 482 P.2d at 964.
61 Nowlin v. State, 346 So. 2d 1020. But whether praising or criticizing Harris, some of
these courts refined the ruling to require the trial court to conduct a voluntariness hearing
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Of the six remaining state supreme courts which addressed the is-
sue, four neither fully embraced Har nor completely rejected it. The
New Jersey and Maryland courts accepted it in principle but limited it
in practice. The New Jersey court had to confront the sort of abuse
which critics of the ruling predicted would flow from it. The court over-
ruled a judge who instructed jurors to feel free to use illegally obtained
statements in determining guilt, since they could not separate, in their
own minds, using illegally obtained statements to assess credibility from
using the statements to determine guilt.62 The court also admonished a
prosecutor who tried to use statements to impeach a defendant's credi-
bility despite the fact that the defendant never testified. 63 The Mary-
land court held more broadly that prosecutors should not use illegally
obtained statements even when defendants do testify unless the defend-
ants themselves raise the subject of their prior statements. 64 The Oregon
and Pennsylvania courts, unlike the New Jersey and Maryland courts,
did not accept the ruling in principle, but they did not reject it in princi-
ple either. They distinguished Harris from cases before them.65
Of all the state supreme courts which addressed the issue, only two
completely rejected Harris.66 The Hawaii court was the first, 67 followed
by the California court, which initially adopted Haiis68 but two years
later rejected it.69 The switch apparently was prompted by a flagrant
violation of Miranda .70 Both courts based their decisions upon state con-
outside the presence of the jury before allowing prosecutors to use illegally obtained state-
ments. The Burger Court did not consider this, as Harris did not claim that his statements
were involuntary. Campbell v. State, 341 So. 2d 742; State v. Jorgenson, 108 Ariz. 476, 502
P.2d 158; Hill v. State, 316 A.2d 557; Booker v. State, 326 So. 2d 791; Wold v. State, 57 Wis.
2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482.
62 State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 337 A.2d 36 (1975).
63 State v. Davis, 67 N.J. 222, 337 A.2d 33 (1975). But for an earlier decision accepting
Harrir in principle, see State v. Falco, 60 N.J. 570, 292 A.2d 13 (1972).
64 State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 375 A.2d 1105 (1977); State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 375
A.2d 1116 (1977).
65 State v. Haas, 267 Or. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973). The court said Harris did not apply
because Harris was not given proper warnings, while Haas was, but was not provided with an
attorney. Commonwealth v. Woods, 455 Pa. 1,312 A.2d 357 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880
(1974); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
66 The courts were free to reject Harris, because the Burger Court has allowed them to
impose stricter standards upon police and prosecutors than it has required them to impose.
In fact, Justice Brennan encouraged them to impose stricter standards. In Mosl he said that
"no State is precluded by the decision from adhering to higher standards under state law.
Each [s]tate has power to impose higher standards governing police practices under state law
than is required by the Federal Constitution." 423 U.S. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
68 People v. Nudd, 12 Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974).
69 People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
70 Id at 116, 545 P.2d at 282, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Wright, C.J., concurring). In addi-
tion to the Hawaii and California courts, the Texas court forbade use of illegally obtained
statements to impeach credibility, but it did so on the basis of a state statute rather than on
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stitutional provisions similar to the fifth amendment's right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination.
The state supreme court's cases are compiled in Table 1. As can be
seen, the courts permitted prosecutors to use illegally obtained state-
ments to impeach defendants' credibility in thirty-five of the forty-three
cases they decided.
TABLE 1




Not Permitted 8 19
Total 43 100
USING SILENCE TO IMPEACH CREDIBILITY
In Miranda the Warren Court stated that prosecutors should not
point to defendants' silence at interrogation. 71 But in Harris the Burger
Court opened the door, perhaps unwittingly, to use of this tactic. Pre-
sumably, the Harris ruling applied only when police violated Miranda
and, as a result, defendants made inculpatory statements. The Harris
Court held that prosecutors could use these statements to impeach de-
fendants' credibility. But the ruling could have been interpreted more
broadly to signal the Court's intention to allow prosecutors greater lee-
way whenever they sought to impeach defendants' credibility. This in-
terpretation raised the possibility that the Court would decide that
prosecutors also could use the fact that defendants were silent at interro-
gation, in order to impeach their credibility. This tactic might be used
if defendants testified and proceeded to give an alibi which they had not
given police at arrest or interrogation. Prosecutors could then ask why
they were silent when it would have been normal for them to give an
alibi if they really had one. This tactic, of course, would penalize de-
fendants for exercising their Miranda-guaranteed right to silence. It
would discourage them from testifying, or, if they did testify, it would
the basis of Mranda or a state constitutional provision, so its decision is not included in the
numerical tally. Whiddon v. State, 492 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App., 1973).
71 "In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation.
The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his
privilege in the face of accusation." 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
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make them vulnerable. The Warren Court realized the dangers inher-
ent in this tactic and prohibited prosecutors from employing it. Yet
after Hanis some courts seemed to expect the Burger Court to permit it.
The Court eventually prohibited this tactic in the federal courts, four
years after Harris, in Hale. One year later, in Doyle, the Court prohib-
ited this tactic in the state courts as well.
In the meantime there was considerable confusion in the state
supreme courts.72 Before Hale fourteen courts had decided cases involv-
ing such prosecutorial conduct. The Kansas and New York courts per-
mitted it.73 Justifying its decision, the New York court stated that Hamri¢
"modified" the scope of Miranda.74 The Arizona court, in four cases in
1971 and 1972, also permitted it.75 The court cited Hari. and declared,
"We are still of the opinion that a defendant who takes the stand waives
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination .... *76 But
the court in 1973 reversed itself.77 The Alaska and Ohio courts permit-
ted it when the defense first mentioned the defendants' silence, but they
indicated they probably would not do so otherwise.78 The nine remain-
ing state supreme courts prohibited the prosecutorial conduct. The
Pennsylvania court asserted sharply that Hamis did not apply;79 the rest
simply said that such conduct violated Miranda.80
After Hale, but before Doyle, five state supreme courts decided
cases involving this conduct. Only the Tennessee court allowed prosecu-
tors to use defendants' silence, and then only when the silence was in-
72 In Hale, Chief Justice Burger called the issue "a tempest in a saucer," but some courts
did find it troublesome. 422 U.S. at 181 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
73 State v. Bly, 215 Kan. 168, 523 P.2d 397 (1974); People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355,
320 N.E.2d 639, 361 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1974).
74 35 N.Y.2d at 359, 320 N.E.2d at 641, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05.
75 State v. Altman, 107 Ariz. 93, 482 P.2d 460 (1971); State v. Peterson, 107 Ariz. 268,485
P.2d 1158 (1971); State v. O'Dell, 108 Ariz. 53, 492 P.2d 1160 (1972); State v. Belcher, 108
Ariz. 290, 496 P.2d 590 (1972).
76 107 Ariz. at 270, 485 P.2d at 1160.
77 State v. Shing, 109 Ariz. 361, 509 P.2d 698 (1973).
78 Davis v. State, 501 P.2d 1026 (Alaska 1972); State v. Young, 27 Ohio St. 2d 310, 272
N.E.2d 353 (1971).
79 Commonwealth v. Dulaney, 449 Pa. 45, 295 A.2d 328 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Woods, 455 Pa. 1, 312 A.2d 357 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974).
80 Hines v. People, 179 Colo. 4, 497 P.2d 1258 (1972); People v. Wright, 182 Colo. 87, 511
P.2d 460 (1973); People v. Robles, 183 Colo. 4, 514 P.2d 630 (1973); People v. Burress, 183
Colo. 146, 515 P.2d 460 (1973); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971); Cessna
v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1971); People v. Graham, 386 Mich. 452, 192
N.W.2d 255 (1971); People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973); Buchanan v.
State, 523 P.2d 1134 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Miles v. State, 525 P.2d 1249 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1974); Reid v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 790, 195 S.E.2d 866 (1973); State v. Dean, 67
Wis. 2d 513, 227 N.W.2d 712 (1975), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); Gabrielson v. State,
510 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1973).
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consistent with defendants' testimony.8 ' The other courts did not allow
prosecutors to use defendants' silence.8 2 While noting that Hale did not
apply to the states, these courts stated that the same reasoning would
apply. The New Jersey court went further, arguing that Hale was not
strong enough, because it was based on the weak evidentiary value of
defendants' silence rather than on the fifth amendment.8 3
After Doyle thirteen state supreme courts decided cases involving
this conduct. Though two distinguished Doyle rather lamely from their
cases,8 4 the others followed Doyle routinely.85 Thus, the Burger Court'sdecisions in Hale and, especially, Doyle seemed to "settle the question"8 6
that the Hams decision had raised.8 7
The state supreme courts' cases are tallied in Table 2. For the en-
tire period between Harris and Doyle the courts permitted prosecutors to
use defendants' silence to impeach their credibility in eleven of the forty-
four cases they decided, with most of these eleven coming before Hale.
81 Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1976).
82 Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1976); Vipperman v. State, 92 Nev.
213, 547 P.2d 682 (1976); State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 358 A.2d 163 (1976); Jerskey v. State,
546 P.2d 173 (Wyo. 1976).
83 State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. at 109, 358 A.2d at 168.
84 State v. Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 364 N.E.2d 216 (1977); State v. Foddrell, 291
N.C. 546, 231 S.E.2d 618 (1977). Actually, the North Carolina court did not mention Doyle,
but it distinguished its case from Hale. Id at 558, 231 S.E.2d at 626.
85 Stork v. State, 559 P.2d 99 (Alaska 1977); State v. Alo, 57 Hawaii 418, 558 P.2d 1012
(1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 922 (1977); State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976);
Jones v. State, 265 Ind. 447, 355 N.E.2d 402 (1976); State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 556 P.2d
387 (1976); State v. Heath, 222 Kan. 50, 563 P.2d 418 (1977); State v. Smith, 336 So. 2d 867
(La. 1976); State v. Lyle, 73 N.J. 403, 375 A.2d 629 (1977); State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d
415 (N.D. 1977); State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1977); State v. Thompson, 88 Wash.
2d 518, 564 P.2d 315 (1977); Irvin v. State, 560 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1977). The Hawaii and
Washington courts did permit prosecutors to use defendants' silence to impeach their testi-
mony if the defendants claimed they were not silent. The Burger Court did approve this. In
Doyle it said, "It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used
by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events
and claims to have told police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of
earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the
defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest." 426 U.S. at 619-20 n. 11. The
Michigan court, in its two cases before Hale, also permitted this. People v. Graham, 386
Mich. at 456-57, 192 N.W.2d at 257; People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. at 359, 212 N.W.2d at 192.
86 State v. Mims, 220 Kan. at 730, 556 P.2d at 391.
87 Occasionally cases arose in which prosecutors used defendants' silence not merely to
impeach their credibility but to infer their guilt. This usually happened when defendants
chose not to testify, thereby thwarting prosecutors' efforts to impeach their credibility. The
prosecutors elicited testimony about the defendants' silence from police and sometimes added
their own comments. State supreme courts nearly always considered this a clear violation of
the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Kagebein v. State, 254 Ark. 904,496 S.W.2d 435 (1973); State
v. Ritson, 210 Kan. 760, 504 P.2d 605 (1972); State v. McCall, 286 N.C. 472, 212 S.E.2d 132
(1975). For a contrary decision, see Bennett v. State, 231 Ga. 458, 202 S.E.2d 99 (1973). But
the Georgia court reversed itself after Doyle. Howard v. State, 237 Ga. 471, 228 S.E.2d 860
(1976).
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TABLE 2
USING SILENCE TO IMPEACH CREDIBILITY
Cases Cases Cases Cases
Before Hale After Hale, After Doyle Total
Ruling Before Dqyle %
Permitted 8 1 2 11 25
Not Permitted 16 5 12 33 75
Total 24 6 14 44 100
GIVING INCORRECT WARNINGS
In Miranda, the Warren Court set forth precise warnings for the
police to give suspects. Apparently the Court had been dissatisfied with
police and lower court compliance with Escobedo, and it sought to clar-
ify, as well as elaborate upon, Escobedo's guidelines. 88 It succeeded; its
more precise warnings seemed to produce greater compliance.8 9 But in
Tucker the Burger Court showed that it might not require adherence to
these precise warnings. It allowed a prosecutor to use statements which
police obtained from a suspect after they gave him incorrect warnings.
They failed to tell him that if he could not afford an attorney the court
would appoint one for him, and the suspect, without benefit of an attor-
ney, made inculpatory statements. The Court said that since the inter-
rogation was before Miranda the police could not be expected to have
complied with Miranda. In addition, the Court said the police nearly
complied with Miranda anyway. The Court did not stipulate which of
these two factors was controlling.90 If the first was, the ruling would
have little application; few cases after Tucker would involve interroga-
tions before Miranda.' But if the second was controlling, the ruling would
have considerable application; many cases would involve at least minor
errors by police when they gave the warnings. Because the Court did
not stipulate, it provided lower courts the opportunity to interpret it as
they wished.
In numerous cases state supreme courts were confronted with com-
plaints that police did not give correct warnings. The complaints fell
into two categories: (1) police did not inform suspects of all their rights,
omitting, usually, the notification that if they were too poor to afford an
88 Romans, supra note 17, at 51-52.
89 Id at 58.
90 Justice Rehnquist did say it was "significant" that the interrogation was before Mi-
randa, but this was as close as he came to indicating which factor was controlling. Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.
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attorney the court would appoint one for them; and (2) police informed
suspects of all their rights but informed them with confusing state-
ments.9 1
When police did not inform suspects of all their rights, state
supreme courts usually reversed the convictions. They reversed them in
thirteen of the sixteen cases they decided. Before Tucker they typically
said the warnings were hollow if they did not include the notification
that the court would appoint an attorney.92 Even in three cases in
which suspects had been interrogated prior to Miranda, as Tucker had
been, the courts concluded that the omission was fatal.93 The only
courts which did not reverse the convictions were those presented with
unusual facts. In one case the suspect had been given correct warnings
three times before the incorrect warning,94 and in another the suspect
could afford an attorney and already had retained one.95 After Tucker,
as well, the courts usually reversed the convictions. The Colorado court
reversed despite the fact that the suspect had an attorney, though not
during interrogation.96  The Pennsylvania court reversed despite the
fact that the suspect had been interrogated prior to Miranda .97 Follow-
ing an earlier decision in the case, the state appealed, and the Burger
Court, in the aftermath of Tucker, remanded the decision. 98 But the
Pennsylvania high court refused to change it. The court asserted that
Tucker was irrelevant, because it dealt with the fruits of an admission
rather than with the admission itself, as here. Also, to be safe, the court
based its decision, in part, on the Pennsylvania Constitution. In con-
trast, the Florida court did not reverse the conviction appealed to it. 99
The case did not concern an interrogation prior to Miranda, so the court
easily could have distinguished it from Tucker. Yet the court chose not
to do so. Ignoring this salient difference between the two cases, the
91 A few cases were deemed too trivial to consider. See Morris v. State, 228 Ga. 39, 184
S.E.2d 82 (1971).
92 Marcus v. State, 291 Ala. 350, 280 So. 2d 793 (1973); People v. Vigil, 175 Colo. 373, 489
P.2d 588 (1971); Perez v. People, 176 Colo. 505, 491 P.2d 969 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Bujnowski, 358 Mass. 821, 267 N.E.2d 924 (1971); State v. Williams, 486 S.W.2d 468 (Mo.
1972); Dayton v. State, 484 P.2d 1322 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Byers v. Oklahoma City, 497
P.2d 1302 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Romberger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353
(1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 964 (1974), afdon remand, 464 Pa. 488, 347 A.2d 460 (1975); Burns v.
State, 486 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Noble v. State, 478 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972); Jackson v. State, 508 S.W.2d 89 (rex. Crim. App. 1974).
93 Commonwealth v. Bujnowski, 358 Mass. 821, 267 N.E.2d 924; Commonwealth v. Rom-
berger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353; Burns v. State, 486 S.W.2d 310.
94 Sanders v. State, 259 Ind. 43, 284 N.E.2d 751 (1972).
95 Brown v. State, 470 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1971).
96 People v. Costa, 193 Colo. 386, 566 P.2d 366 (1977).
97 Commonwealth v. Romberger, 464 Pa. 488, 347 A.2d 460 (1975).
98 Commonwealth v. Romberger, 417 U.S. 964 (1974).
99 Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975).
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court quoted Tucker's remark that Miranda was not meant "'to create a
constitutional strait jacket.' "100 The court said the warnings were cor-
rect enough. Thus, the court showed how a lower court can interpret an
ambiguous ruling so as to weaken constitutional rights perhaps more
than the upper court had intended.
When police informed suspects of all their rights but informed
them with confusing statements, state supreme courts were less willing
to reverse the convictions. This was true before Tucker as well as after.
The courts reversed the convictions in just twelve of the thirty-five cases
they decided. In some of the cases, the complaints alleged that police
did not convey clearly the right to appointed counsel. For example, po-
lice gave the following warning: "If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer
and want one, we will see that you have a lawyer provided to you before
we ask you any questions." Appellants claimed this warning did not
indicate that the lawyer would be free, but they could not convince the
courts.101 In other cases the complaints alleged that police did not con-
vey clearly the right to appointed counsel for interrogation, as well as for
trial. For example, police gave the following warning: "You have the
right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to
hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be ap-
pointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to
answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to
stop answering questions at any time." While two courts ruled this in-
adequate,10 2 six ruled it sufficiently clear. 103 Police gave similar warn-
ings which appellants claimed did not convey the right to counsel for
interrogation, but courts generally were not sympathetic.1 04 The Wis-
100 Id at 537 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444, quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. at 467).
101 Commonwealth v. Swint, 450 Pa. 54, 296 A.2d 777 (1972); Commonwealth v. Ponton,
450 Pa. 40,299 A.2d 634 (1972); Commonwealth v. Jordan, 451 Pa. 275,301 A.2d 667 (1973).
102 Moore v. State, 251 Ark. 436, 472 S.W.2d 940 (1971); Reed v. State, 255 Ark. 63, 498
S.W.2d 877 (1973); Schorr v. State, 499 P.2d 450 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), overmled in part,
Rowbotham v. State, 542 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
103 Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973); Dickerson v. State, 257 Ind. 562, 276
N.E.2d 845 (1972); State v. Carpenter, 211 Kan. 234, 505 P.2d 753 (1973); Evans v. State, 275
So. 2d 83 (Miss. 1973); Holifield v. State, 275 So. 2d 851 (Miss. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S.
990 (1973); Burge v. State, 282 So. 2d 223 (Miss. 1973), cert. dnied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974);
People v. Buckler, 39 N.Y.2d 895, 352 N.E.2d 583, 386 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1976); Rowbotham v.
State, 542 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
104 Emler v. State, 259 Ind. 241, 286 N.E.2d 408 (1972); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94, 292
N.E.2d 790 (1973); Sotelo v. State, 264 Ind. 298, 342 N.E.2d 844 (1976); Provo v. State, 565
P.2d 719 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 451 Pa. 472, 304 A.2d 102
(1973). But some courts were sympathetic. Watson v. State, 255 Ark. 631, 501 S.W.2d 609
(1973); State v. Fossen, 312 Minn. 414, 255 N.W.2d 357 (1977); Biggerstaffv. State, 491 P.2d
345 (Okla. Grim. App. 1971); Byers v. Oklahoma City, 497 P.2d 1302 (Okla. Crim. App.
1972); Gravett v. State, 509 P.2d 914 (Okla. Grim. App. 1973); Anderson v. State, 510 P.2d
998 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
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consin court epitomized such decisions when it admitted that the warn-
ings were not "a model of clarity" but noted that they did include all
the rights. 10 5 Some courts found support in Tucker for their decisions.' 0 6
The Florida court said Tucker recognized the difference between "a vio-
lation of the defendants' substantive consitutional rights" and "an inad-
vertent violation of the procedural safeguards designed to protect those
rights."10 7 In still other cases the complaints alleged that police did not
convey clearly the warning that anything the suspects said could be used
against them. These complaints arose when some police warned sus-
pects that anything they said could be used "for or against" them. Ob-
viously nothing they said would be used "for" them, so the warning was
misleading. One court found that it violated Miranda,108 but three
others thought the error was too minor to constitute a violation. 10 9
Again, the Wisconsin court said this misleading warning was not major
enough to invalidate a confession automatically, but that giving it is "a
practice that should not be encouraged, and in some circumstances
could result in the vitiation of an otherwise antiseptic confession."' 110
The courts' rulings in these cases are displayed in Table 3. As
shown, the courts excused the police's errors in twenty-six of the fifty-
one cases. Also, as shown, the courts did not rule much differently after
Tucker than they did before it.
REFUSING TO STOP INTERROGATION, RESUMING INTERROGATION
In Miranda, the Warren Court made clear that suspects undergoing
interrogation can exercise their rights to silence or an attorney and re-
quest police to stop the interrogation at any time.I' The Court empha-
105 Jones v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 337, 342, 230 N.W.2d 677, 681 (1975).
106 See, e.g., State v. Statewright, 300 So. 2d 674, 677-78 (Fla. 1974); State v. Davis, 336 So.
2d 805, 808 (La. 1976).
107 State v. Statewright, 300 So. 2d at 677.
108 Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046
(1972); Commonwealth v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 285 A.2d 175 (1971).
109 State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 319 A.2d 450 (1974); State v. Vidal, 82 Wash. 2d 74, 508
P.2d 158 (1974); Madkins v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 347, 184 N.W.2d 144 (1971); McClellan v.
State, 53 Wis. 2d 724, 193 N.W.2d 711 (1972).
11O Id at 730, 193 N.W.2d at 715. Occasionally cases arose in which appellants claimed
that police violated Miranda by failing to warn them that if they waived their rights and
began answering questions, they could assert their rights anytime later and stop answering
questions. The Warren Court said, "[olnce warnings have been given the subsequent proce-
dure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during ques-
tioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." 384 U.S. at 473-74.
State supreme courts agreed that these are "guidelines for police conduct, not additional
elements of the required warning." Miller v. State, 263 Ind. 595, 597, 335 N.E.2d 206, 208
(1975).
I11 "If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45.
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sized that suspects' requests must be "scrupulously honored." 112 But in
Mosley the Burger Court permitted a prosecutor to use statements ob-
tained after police acceded to a suspect's request to stop but then re-
sumed the interrogation two hours later. In Miranda, the Warren Court
did not consider this kind of situation. Therefore, Mosly can be viewed
as refining Miranda or, if that precedent is read more literally, weakening
it. The Burger Court insisted that Mos/ey be viewed as the former.' 13




Not Inform Informed Categories







Ruling Tucker Tucker Tucker Tucker Tucker Tucker Total %
Permitted 2 1 16 7 18 8 26 51
Not Permitted 11 2 10 24 21 4 25 49
Total 13 3 26 9 39 12 51 100
a When police did not inform suspects of all their rights.
b When police informed suspects of all their rights but informed them with confusing state-
ments.
c The two categories combined.
In related cases state supreme courts decided whether police must
honor suspects' requests to stop. These cases fell into four categories: (1)
suspects requested silence, but police refused to stop; (2) suspects re-
quested an attorney, but police refused to stop for them to get one; (3)
suspects requested silence, and police agreed to stop but resumed again;
and (4) suspects requested an attorney, and police agreed to stop but
resumed again before the suspects got one.
When suspects requested silence but police refused to stop, state
supreme courts held the resulting statements inadmissible in ten of the
twelve cases they heard. They held the statements inadmissible whether
police ignored repeated requests to halt' 1 4 or, after the initial request,
112 Id at 479.
113 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-07.
114 D.P. v. State, 556 P.2d 1256 (Alaska 1976); Holmes v. State, 300 A.2d 6 (Del. 1972);
People v. Henenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 5, 302 N.E.2d 27 (1973); State v. Crow, 486 S.W.2d 248 (Mo.
1972).
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subtly prolonged the conversation in hope that suspects would continue
talking and answering questions.115 Even after Mosley the courts did not
relax their standards. The Arizona and Texas courts declared that Mos-
ley "reaffirmed the holding in Miranda" that requests to halt must be
scrupulously honored. 116 The Arizona court noted that although of-
ficers ceased interrogation "their subsequent conduct and statements
were made to persuade the defendant to reconsider his position. Any
response under such circumstances cannot be considered 'volun-
teered.' "117 Only the Louisiana court decided to the contrary. In a pair
of cases, it, in effect, brushed Miranda aside and used the voluntariness
test. 118
When suspects requested an attorney but police refused to stop for
them to get one, state supreme courts did not rule quite as consistently.
They held the statements inadmissible in eighteen of the twenty-seven
cases they heard. While they held them inadmissible in nearly all cases
in which police ignored repeated requests to halt, 119 or even a single
clear request, 120 they did not always hold them inadmissible when the
requests were not repeated or clear. According to Miranda, the clarity or
number of requests should not have mattered, for the ruling mandates
police to cease immediately if suspects indicate "in any manner" that
they want the police to cease. 12 1 For a few courts these factors did not
matter.122 The California court said the requests did not need to be
115 People v. Superior Court of Marin County, 13 Cal. 3d 406, 530 P.2d 585, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 617 (1975); State v. Smith, 295 Minn. 65, 203 N.W.2d 348 (1972); State v. Gallagher,
38 Ohio St. 2d 291, 313 N.E.2d 396 (1974).
116 State v. Sauve, 112 Ariz. 576, 579, 544 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1976); State v. Lee, 114 Ariz.
101, 106, 559 P.2d 657, 662 (1976). See also Hearne v. State, 534 S.W.2d 703, 706-07 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976).
117 State v. Sauve, 112 Ariz. at 579, 544 P.2d at 1094.
118 State v. Higginbotham, 261 La. 983, 261 So. 2d 638 (1972); State v. Bradford, 263 La.
966, 269 So. 2d 831 (1972).
119 State v. Edwards, 111 Ariz. 357, 529 P.2d 1174 (1974); People v. Enriquez, 19 Cal. 3d
221, 561 P.2d 261, 137 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1977); Brown v. State, 256 Ind. 558, 270 N.E.2d 751
(1971); State v. Hilpipre, 242 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 1976); Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483 (Wyo.
1975). The sole exception was State v. Edgell, 30 Ohio St. 2d 103, 283 N.E.2d 145 (1972).
120 Webb v. State, 258 Ark. 95, 522 S.W.2d 406 (1975); People v. Salazar, 189 Colo. 429,
541 P.2d 676 (1975); People v. Turner, 56 I1. 2d 201, 306 N.E.2d 27 (1973); Interest of
Thompson, 241 N.W.2d 2 (Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. Murray, 359 Mass. 541, 269
N.E.2d 641 (1971); State v. Hicks, 290 N.C. 767, 228 S.E.2d-252 (1976); State v. Siler, 292
N.C. 543, 234 S.E.2d 733 (1977); State v. Jones, 37 Ohio St. 2d 21, 306 N.E.2d 409 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Bullard, 465 Pa. 341,350 A.2d 797 (1976); State v. Chapman, 84 Wash. 2d
373, 526 P.2d 64 (1974). The exceptions were Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976);
Niehaus v. State, 265 Ind. 655, 359 N.E.2d 513, cert. dnied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
121 384 U.S. at 445.
122 People v. Superior Court of Mono County, 15 Cal. 3d 729, 542 P.2d 1390, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 798 (1975); People v. Harris, 191 Colo. 234, 552 P.2d 10 (1976); Micale v. State, 76 Wis.
2d 370, 251 N.W.2d 458 (1977).
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unmistakably clear. 123 But for other courts they did matter. Although
suspects indicated in at least some manner that they wanted police to
cease until they got an attorney, the police either sought to discourage
them, 124 or they simply continued to question them,1 25 and the courts
excused the officers' conduct.
When suspects requested silence and police agreed to stop but re-
sumed again, the courts did not side with the appellants as often as they
did when police refused to stop. In fact, they rarely sided with the ap-
pellants. They held the statements inadmissible in just two of the eleven
cases they heard. In both cases the police resumed shortly after stop-
ping.126 However, in other cases the police resumed fifteen minutes af-
ter stopping 27 or twenty to thirty minutes after stopping, 128 and the
courts did not hold the statements inadmissible. The decisions seemed
to mock the suspects' requests that interrogation cease, but the courts
said that they considered factors besides the length of time between
stopping and resuming. These factors included a change in locations, in
the officers conducting the interrogation, or in the charges to be filed
against the suspect.1 29 It is not apparent why a change in locations or in
the officers conducting the interrogation would justify renewed ques-
tioning, but consideration of these factors meant that the balance almost
always weighed against the appellants.130 In response to an appellant's
claim that any resumption narrowed Miranda, the Colorado court justi-
fied its decision by stating that "a periodic repeating of the procedure
until the accused finally makes a statement would not be permitted." 13'
When suspects requested an attorney and police agreed to stop but
resumed again before the suspects got one, the courts issued rulings
123 People v. Superior Court of Mono County, 15 Cal. 3d at 736, 542 P.2d at 1395, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 802-03 (quoting People v. Randall, I Cal. 3d 948, 955, 464 P.2d 114, 118, 83
Cal. Rptr. 658, 662 (1970)).
124 Riddle v. State, 264 Ind. 587, 348 N.E.2d 635 (1976); Meyer v. Commonwealth, 482
S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Shadoan v. Commonwealth, 484
S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1972); State v. Keesecker, 198 Neb. 426, 253 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
125 People v. White, 61 Ill. 2d 288, 335 N.E.2d 457 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 970 (1976);
LaBonte v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 677, 232 S.E.2d 738 (1977); Clodfelter v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 98, 235 S.E.2d 340 (1977).
126 State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977); Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa.
211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973).
127 State v. Robinson, 87 S.D. 375, 209 N.W.2d 374 (1973).
128 State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 201 (1975).
129 See id at 434, 219 S.E.2d at 212.
130 Dyett v. People, 177 Colo. 370, 494 P.2d 94 (1972); Rogers v. State, 262 Ind. 315, 315
N.E.2d 707 (1974); State v. O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60,216 N.W.2d 822 (1974); People v. Gary, 31
N.Y.2d 68, 286 N.E.2d 263, 334 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1972); Dennis v. State, 561 P.2d 88 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972); State v.
Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d 476, 217 N.W.2d 359, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
131 Dyett v. People, 177 Colo. at 373, 494 P.2d at 95.
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which did not show any pattern. They held the statements inadmissible
in six of the thirteen cases they decided. Thus, they did side with the
appellants more often than they did when the appellants requested si-
lence and police resumed. Perhaps this was due to the unequivocal sen-
tence in Miranda: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 132 Or perhaps
this was due to Justice Stewart's comment in Mosley that the case would
have been different if Mosley had asked for an attorney. 133  For
whatever reason, state supreme courts held statements inadmissible not
only when police apparently used deception,13 4 but also when police
subtly thwarted efforts to call an attorney, 135 subtly resumed interroga-
tion,136 and even innocently questioned a suspect who already had asked
another officer for an attorney. 137 Yet other courts did not hold state-
ments obtained in very similar circumstances inadmissible. 138 One
court did not hold statements inadmissible even when they were ob-
tained after repeated demands for an attorney. 139 These courts seemed
to disregard Miranda and substitute the voluntariness test. 140
The cases are broken down in Table 4. As shown, the courts al-
lowed the police conduct in twenty-eight of the sixty-three cases. Also,
as shown, the number of cases in which they allowed the conduct did
not increase after Mosley.
132 384 U.S. at 474. See State v. Lachapelle, 112 R.I. 105, 308 A.2d 467 (1973).
133 423 U.S. at 101, n.7. See State v. Moscone, 171 Conn. 500, 370 A.2d 1030 (1976).
134 State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 360 A.2d 548 (1976).
135 People v. Jackson, 41 N.Y.2d 146, 359 N.E.2d 677, 391 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
136 People v. Richards, 194 Colo. 83, 568 P.2d 1173 (1977).
137 Commonwealth v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 285 A.2d 175 (1971).
138 Apparently used deception and subtly thwarted efforts to call-State v. Krueger, 194
Neb. 304, 231 N.W.2d 364 (1975); subtly resumed interrogation--State v. Miley, 291 N.C.
431, 230 S.E.2d 537 (1976); innocently questioned suspect who already had asked another
officer for an attorney-Looms v. State, 261 Ark. 803, 551 S.W.2d 546 (1977). Cases which
did not involve similar circumstances were Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 445 Pa. 1, 281 A.2d
852 (1971); Sweiberg v. State, 511 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Grim. App. 1974).
139 Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978).
140 See French v. State, 266 Ind. 276, 362 N.E.2d 834 (1977). Occasionally cases arose in
which police themselves decided to stop interrogation but later resumed again without giving
the Airanda warnings anew. See, e.g., State v. Gholson, 112 Ariz. 545, 544 P.2d 654 (1976).
State supreme courts considered a variety of factors when they judged the police conduct.
For discussion, see Commonwealth v. Wideman, 460 Pa. 699, 706-07, 334 A.2d 594, 598
(1975). Generally, the courts permitted the conduct on the grounds that the police were















































It was hypothesized that the state supreme courts eroded the Mi-
randa principles first enunciated by the Warren Court. Unquestionably,
this hypothesis was upheld. Most courts permitted prosecutors to use
illegally obtained statements to impeach defendants' credibility, to use
statements made when police gave confusing warnings, and to use state-
ments made when police resumed interrogation after suspects had cut
off interrogation by demanding silence.
It was also hypothesized that the state supreme courts eroded the
Miranda principles more than the Burger Court had. Generally, this hy-
pothesis was not supported. Though some courts read Hais as a cue to
relax enforcement of the Miranda principles and to allow prosecutors to
use defendants' silence to impeach their credibility, most did not. Also
most courts did not allow prosecutors to use statements made when po-
lice gave incomplete warnings or to use statements made when police
refused to cease interrogation after suspects had asked them to cease.
Of course, not all state supreme courts exhibited similar decision-
making. Differences between them were described throughout the arti-
cle and can be seen in Table 5. With the large number of cases poten-
tially relevant to this research, it was hoped that each state court could
be classified according to the degree to which it eroded the Miranda prin-
ciples. Unfortunately, the number of cases was not large enough. Some
courts did not decide any cases which were relevant, and other decided
only a handful. Consequently, most courts could not be classified. Nev-
ertheless, it is worth noting that some courts, such as the Florida, Indi-
ana, and Mississippi courts, were prone to erode the principles, while
others, such as the Colorado and Wyoming courts, were not.
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TABLE 5
ACCEPTANCE OF ALL POLICE AND PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICES,
By STATEa
Not Not





























New Hampshire 0 0
New Jersey 2 5
New Mexico 0 0
New York 3 1
North Carolina 5 2





Rhode Island 0 2
South Carolina 0 0











a All of the practices covered in this article.
b Number of cases in which the courts permitted the police and prosecutorial practices at
issue.
c Number of cases in which the courts did not permit the practices at issue.
However, there were enough cases to show regional differences.
Overall, the courts decided to allow the police and prosecutorial prac-
tices at issue in about fifty percent of their cases, but, as Table 6 shows,
this figure is misleading. It masks sharp regional differences.1 4 ' The
southern and midwestem courts were most prone to erode Miranda,
141 Even if the courts with a disproportionate number of cases, such as the Indiana court,
are excluded, the figures show substantial regional differences.
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while the western and eastern courts were least prone to do so. Presum-
ably, the greater political conservatism of the South and Midwest ex-
tended to judicial acceptance of the Miranda principles. 142
TABLE 6
ACCEPTANCE OF ALL POLICE AND PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICES,
BY REGIONa
Region Permittedb Not Permittedc % Permitted
Eastd 15 25 37.5
Midweste 39 29 57.35
South' 27 15 64.29
West g  18 33 35.29
Total 99 102 49.25
a All of the practices covered in this article.
b Number of cases in which the courts permitted the police and prosecutorial practices
at issue.
c Number of cases in which the courts did not permit the practices at issue.
d Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia.
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin.
f Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.
g Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
Of the three models used to characterize the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the lower courts, the bureaucratic model, where
the Supreme Court establishes policy and the lower courts impose bu-
reaucratic restraints, is the most useful in explaining the relationship as
142 Dolbeare and Hammond found remarkably similar regional differences in their study
of school district compliance with the Court's school prayer decisions. The southern and
midwestern school districts complied least, while the eastern and western districts complied
most. K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT
POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE 29-32 (1971). Consequently, Charles Johnson suggested that
region might be the system-level variable most consistently related to lower court reaction to
Supreme Court decisions. Johnson, The Implementation andImpact ofJudidalPolicies: A Heuristic
Model, in PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 107, 118 (J. Gardiner ed. 1977). Kagan, Cart-
wright, Friedman, and Wheeler suggested that the extent of case-selecting discretion might be
a variable related to state supreme court reaction to Supreme Court criminal decisions. Ka-
gan, Cartwright, Friedman, & Wheeler, The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV.
961, 994-97 (1978); Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, & Wheeler, The Buszess of State Supreme
Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1977). Though this variable is intriguing as an
explanation for differences in state supreme court decision-making, it does not explain the
differences in this research. This could be due to the small number of cases individual courts
decided, or it could be due to other, unknown factors.
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it affects the Miranda policy. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Warren established the policy, and the Court under Chief Justice Bur-
ger maintained the policy, with one significant exception. 143 Moreover,
the Court persuaded the state supreme courts to implement the policy.
Previous research found that the state supreme courts generally enforced
the Miranda requirements as early as 1968,144 and this research found
that the state supreme courts generally enforced the requirements
throughout the 1970s.145 Nevertheless, the courts did not implement the
policy automatically. They eroded it in certain types of cases. Natu-
rally, they eroded it in cases in which prosecutors used illegally obtained
statements to impeach defendants' credibility, but they eroded it here in
response to the Burger Court's single change in the Miranda policy.
However, they eroded it in other cases as well.
In addition, the bureaucratic model is the most useful in explaining
the relationship between the Supreme Court and state supreme courts
because the model suggests that Court policy which is clear is more
likely to be implemented than policy which is not clear. While Miranda
was clear, the Burger Court's rulings which weakened Miranda, with one
exception, were not particularly clear. Consequently, they did not result
in as much erosion of the Miranda principles by state supreme courts as
observers seemed to expect. Instead, these courts often refused to alter
their liberal policies regarding confessions, even though the Burger
Court's rulings were unquestionably conservative in direction. Corre-
spondingly, the Burger Court's ruling that was the one exception and
was clear-Harnr---did result in considerable erosion. Thus, the role of
clarity, as seen in the relationship between Escobedo and Miranda, also
can be seen in the relationship between Miranda and the Burger Court's
rulings.
The role of clarity can be illustrated more specifically by noting a
pair of distinctions drawn by many of the courts. The courts did not
excuse police when they gave incomplete warnings but did excuse police
when they gave confusing warnings; and the courts did not excuse police
when they refused to cease interrogation after suspects had asked them
to cease but did excuse police when they resumed interrogation after
they agreed to cease. The first practice of each of these distinctions is
explicitly prohibited by Miranda, while the second of each is prohibited
143 The exception is permitting prosecutors to use illegally obtained statements to impeach
defendants' credibility.
144 Romans, supra note 17, at 52-53.
145 It is worth noting that the courts' opinions seem to reflect the expectation that Miranda
will continue to remain in effect. The opinions do not predict the ruling's demise, unlike the
commentators' remarks. Further, the opinions do not criticize the ruling often. In fact, they
criticize the ruling less often than they do the Burger Court's decisions which chipped away at
it.
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only implicitly. Because the second of each is prohibited only implicitly,
the courts could claim that the policy regarding these practices is ambig-
uous. Their claim might reflect genuine confusion, or it might reflect a
desire to exploit the situation for their own preferred ends. Either way,
the policy regarding these practices was not implemented due to the
bureaucratic inefficiency or recalcitrance provoked by the ambiguity.
The role of clarity, as seen in the relationship between Miranda and
the Burger Court's rulings, would also suggest the validity of the "Neu-
stadt theory" to explain lower court reaction to Supreme Court rulings.
This theory is derived from Neustadt's analysis of presidential power to
obtain compliance with directives. 146 Applied to judicial power, this
theory maintains that rulings which are clearly written, persuasively ar-
gued, and apparently final are more likely to produce compliance than
those which are not. 14 7 Miranda was clearly written and, at the same
time, probably perceived as persuasively argued and apparently final.' 48
In conclusion, the state supreme courts eroded the Miranda princi-
ples, but they did not erode them as much as they might have been
expected to do. They did not erode them more than the Burger Court
itself did. Nevertheless, if the Court does continue to weaken Miranda,
prosecutors undoubtedly would ask the state supreme courts to follow.
The courts would not have to do so, however, since they could effec-
tively insulate liberal decisions from Supreme Court review by basing
these decisions upon their state constitution or statutes. In fact, some
146 See R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP WITH RE-
FLECTIONS ON JOHNSON AND NIXON (1976 ed.).
147 For a fuller explanation of this theory, see G. TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE
SUPREME COURTS 85-103 (1977).
148 A ruling that is clear is more likely to be perceived as persuasive and final, rather than
as a reflection of some inchoate doctrine. But in other respects, as well, Miranda, in compari-
son with Escobedo and other previous rulings, probably was perceived as persuasive and final.
Romans, supra note 17, at 51-52. With the issuance of the Burger Court's rulings, of course,
Miranda, in comparison with them, might not have been perceived as so final. But these
rulings came five and more years after Mranaa, and, as such, after Miranda produced compli-
ance with the warning requirements. Had the rulings come right on the heels of Miranda,
presumably they would have undermined the perception of finality of the ruling, and pre-
sumably they would have resulted in more erosion by the state supreme courts.
An alternative to the Neustadt theory is the "state impact theory." This theory main-
tains that rulings which require disruption of long-standing state policies in order to produce
compliance are less likely to produce compliance than rulings which do not require such
disruption. For a fuller discussion of this theory, see G. TARR, supra note 147, at 105-20. This
theory is not as applicable to the present research as the Neustadt theory. While it could be
argued that state supreme courts were reluctant to reverse their long-standing (five and more
years) policy of complying with Miranda in favor of eroding Miranda in response to the Burger
Court's rulngs, "their" policy was a federally imposed policy initially and, because of the
opportunity for appellate and habeas corpus review, a federally monitored policy continually.
Further, state supreme courts were not reluctant to reverse "their" policy in response to the
Burger Court's one clear ruling in Harris. Thus, the crucial factor seems to be clarity rather
than disruption of long-standing state policies.
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commentators have urged the courts not to follow the Supreme
Court.1 49 Still, if the Court does continue to weaken Miranda, many of
the state supreme courts probably will follow, 1 50 especially if their re-
sponse to Harrzs is taken to be indicative. It would be ironic if, after the
battle to implement the Miranda principles, had been largely won, the
Burger Court sacrificed the victory.
149 Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAav. L. REv. 489,
502 (1977).
150 Neubome, The Myth of Pario, 90 HAsv. L. REv. 1105 (1977). But although Neuborne
is not optimistic that state supreme courts would issue liberal decisions in this kind of situa-
tion, others have noted such decisions already. Brennan, supra note 149, at 498-502. See also
Porter, State Supireme Courts and the Legacy of the Warren Court: Sone Old Inquiries for a New Situa-
tion, 8 PuBLius 55 (1978), and other articles cited therein.
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